Home | My Cartoon Books | My Books | Links | Contact

7

 

Ivan Illich: Radical Theologian or Liberal Revisionist?

An exchange with Elizabeth Templeton, author and theologian.

 

Unlike the other debaters Elizabeth is and old friend. Our discussions often end with her offering me books to read. Last time she lent me Ivan Illich’s final work The Rivers North of the Future.This consists of a series of transcribed talks and interviews given shortly before Illich’s death in 2002, recorded and edited by Illich's friend and colleague David Cayley. Since I have always been in equal measure fascinated by Illich analysis of society and disgusted by his biblical exegesis I gladly accepted to debate his work as representing radical twentieth century liberal theology at its best.

 

In The Rivers North of the Future Illich argues that historically the church attempted to safeguard the newness of the Gospel by institutionalizing it, the result being the Christian state which attempts to take care of its citizens from cradle to grave, thereby obviating the need for people to care for each other. He sees this as a typical example of the classical dictum corruptio optimi pessima est ‘the corruption of the best is the worst".

Like all of Illich’s social comments, be they on the subject of education, medicine, the speed of travel or as here, ‘the functioning of the modern state’ I find this thesis both amazing and helpful. Indeed I would not wish to add or subtract anything for fear of inflicting damage on what is clearly a work of art. All I can say is that everyone should read it. However, when Illich starts to expose what he claims as being the biblical basis for his social comment words like disappointment and disbelief spring to mind as an appropriate description of my feelings.

Like most if not all biblicists of the liberal variety Ivan Illich works with the conviction that the Bible is concerned to teach that life is about unrestricted freedom. Introducing the idea of incarnation by means of the term pregnancy he writes:

The image of pregnancy should not be read as suggesting that the Incarnation was in any sense necessary, pre-determined or inevitable. It was and remains an outworking of pure unrestrained freedom, and this is something very difficult for the modern mind to grasp.’ [Rivers p. 49]

But how can I be so sure that what we have here is liberal rather than biblical exegesis? Surely Illich is right to claim that the Bible is built on the idea of liberation? For are not the Exodus texts full of the language of freedom? I am happy to admit this is the case; however, what worries me is the colour Illich attributes to this language. The fact of the matter is that all ideologies make use of the language of freedom. What distinguishes them therefore is not the use of the concept itself but rather the political colour they attribute to it.

In conservative ideologies freedom is the blissful climate in which the status quo remains unthreatened by either foreign forces or internal subversive ones. You can surely sense this right-wing conservative colouring in the slogan: ‘Britons never never shall be slaves’. 

In liberalism on the other hand freedom means the absence of both conservative restrictions imposed from above and socialist restrictions imposed from beneath. As a consequence the clarion cry of liberals like Illich and the rest of them - they are many for, of course, liberalism is the dominant force in our day - is ‘unrestricted freedom’.

For socialists, to the contrary, freedom means an absence of class domination and by extension of gender and race domination too. Hence all of the great liberation slogans of our age and the socialist (not to say Marxist) colour of liberation theologies.

What people should now realise is that leaving aside the conservative notion of freedom which certainly is to be found in some passages of the Bible, especially the revisionist texts ( e.g. The P source in Genesis and Exodus, Ezekiel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Zechariah 1-8, Haggai and Chronicles etc.) neither of the other notions of freedoms discussed are present in any shape or form – hardly surprising when you realise they are the consequence of modern revolutionary thinking whether of the bourgeois or proletarian variety. The fact is that, in the main, freedom in the Bible is a marginal concept associated with God’s responsibilities in the great covenant agreement. In the first analysis the word means rescue from civilisations claws. In the final analysis it means salvation which is generally spoken about in terms of the softening of Gentile hearts. If we now go back to Illich’s use of the word freedom I put it to you that it is only too easy to identify liberal colouring within it. On the other hand wouldn’t you agree that it is neigh impossible to find any trace of the Bible’s own marginal colouring?

In my book God of the Marginals (published on this site) I point out that the Hebrew writers used the language of sex to describe ideological misdemeanour (See God of the Marginals pp. 180-183). Using this language I would not hesitate to call Illich’s talk of unrestricted freedom in connection with their work obscene. Some will find this judgement harsh. They will protest that people have always discussed the Bible in their own historical and geographical terms, witness for example Chinese and Indian nativity scenes which are filled with Chinese and Indian characters. They will argue that just as in texts from the middle-ages one finds the Bible spoken about in terms appropriate to that epoch isn’t it natural to find people like Illich speaking about the Bible in 20th century liberal terms? But I would beg to disagree. In the first place Illich is a scholar and scholars claim they avoid such errors. However, more importantly, what we are talking about here is an ideological and not an historical or cultural transformation, which, given that the Bible puts itself forward as an ideological text, makes the transformation inexcusable. Indeed I see Illich as being guilty of replacing the Bible’s marginal ideology with his own civilization alternative. In this way, whether he is aware of it or not, he deprives the marginals of their own text – their only defence – and it seems to me that ‘obscene’ is a rather mild way to describe such conduct.  

In this connection I note that Illich’s attribution of unrestrained freedom to Yahweh is not just obscene but also absurd. Yahweh can hardly be accurately described as acting in an unrestrained manner since there is nothing that could conceivable restrain him. It seems to me that the biblical characteristic which Illich is attempting to put his finger on here – but describing wrongly as a result of his liberal perspective – is what I call the metacosmic notion: the idea that Yahweh has no needs which the universe can possibly satisfy. His error in defining this characteristic is monumental for, as a presumed characteristic of God, the characteristic thereby becomes the watch-word of all those who align themselves with this God. To put it baldly, Illich describes the biblical god as acting free of all restrictions because he aims to argue that the Bible itself recommends such behaviour. However, this argument that the Bible advocates that people should live their lives openly, regardless of all restraints, is patently false. Jesus certainly recommended that his followers should, as it were, forget their needs, believing that God would satisfy these. But he never said that they should ‘compete freely in life without fear of restrictions clinging to this responsibility and not allowing either Church or state to take it over’ or indeed anything remotely like it. This, as I have indicated above, should surprise no one since it constitutes the product of bourgeois thought-processes not yet mentally formulated let alone expressed in biblical times.

In his exposé Illich couples this essentially modern and hence unbiblical notion of unrestrained freedom with another notion: grace, gift and gratuity.

What happens, with us, is either the outcome of chance or some chain of causal necessity. We  have lost the sense that there exists between these extremes a reality of gratuity … that comes into being in response to a call, rather than a determinative cause. …. In the Bible this (gratuity) is the primary form of “causation”. … The Gospel extracts from its reader the recognition that what is present is neither necessity nor chance but a superabundant gift freely given to those who freely receive it.

He then goes on to try and demonstrate that this thesis of ‘unrestrained freedom’ linked to ‘a superabundant gift freely given’ (the reverse side of the coin as it were) is biblical, using the parable of the Samaritan. He claims that Jesus’ story of a Samaritan who helps a hated Jew is designed to teach the lesson of this freely given and freely received gratuity. My disagreement with Illich here is just about total which makes the argument itself complicated since it is not possible to restrict the disagreement within an easily manageable confine. So let us start with speech-form analysis where things are simplest.

Speech-form analysis shows that parables function by illuminating a clouded situation by offering an obvious comparison. In other words the illustration is only able to perform its illuminating task because of its manifest nature, vindicated by common sense: ‘You do not light a lamp and then put it under the bed’. This means that parables are incapable of teaching anything let alone ideological truths such as that life is about freedom and gratuity since the kind of points they make are of necessity utterly obvious and banal e.g. ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’. In fact, of course, parables don’t make points any more than they teach truths. As illustrations they work by illuminating some fault which is being committed which, though perfectly obvious, someone has for some reason made themselves blind to, and the parable as an illustration provides not a new truth but simply light, so as to be able to see the error in question for what it is. All a parable as an illustration does is metaphorically to open someone’s eyes. Socrates’ parable of the hunter is a good example. Lysias is writing a poem to his lover in which he praises the young boy up to the nines but Socrates attempts to get him to see how foolish he is being by likening him to a hunter who frightens off his prey. No one in their right mind would attempt to argue that Socrates believed it was an important truth to learn that hunters shouldn’t frighten away their prey!

All of this being the case it seems to me that we can say without fear of contradiction that in claiming that Jesus used the parable of the Samaritan as a device for teaching a lesson concerning an ideological or spiritual truth Illich is completely up the creek. For clearly a parable as a speech-form is incapable of teaching such a truth or any truth for that matter.

But that is just for starters. Illich only manages to kid us that he is on to something by claiming that in Jesus’ story the man who fell among thieves was a Jew. If it turns out that he wasn’t then of course Illich’s whole construct disintegrates like a house of cards. Well, was the man who fell among thieves a Jew? I don’t know for sure and neither do you for the story itself does not say. It might have given us some indication had it told us his name but it doesn’t. But perhaps his clothes would have given the game away? Unfortunately the story tells us that he was left for dead having been stripped naked. Perhaps he had a flag stuck to his head or, more crudely still, perhaps his circumcised prick was showing … but I am being facetious! It may occur to you that since the road itself was in Jewish territory it was quite likely the man was indeed a Jew… only unfortunately the road named was an international trade-rout taken by everyone in the region and in any case for the story to work in the way in which Illich requires a mere likelihood is hardly sufficient. You must admit that if Jesus was concerned to make the point Illich highlights then he made a mighty bad choice of story. What is more he did not even then try to make up for this error by simply telling his hearers the man was a Jew. This would at least have put them in the know even if the Samaritan, the man who counted, would still have been in the dark. The truth is that the more you think about it the more it becomes clear that Illich is attempting to sell us a pup, his entire construct consisting of disgraceful exegesis (rather a laugh when you remember that Illich thinks the story is all about grace!)

That is the easy part of the exercise. Now let us turn to Illich’s basic thesis which is not simply about this particular story, where I find no difficulty in blowing his cover, but about the Bible as a whole. As I have already said his argument that unrestricted freedom is the cornerstone of the Bible can only be a liberal invention. The Bible certainly speaks of salvation but by this it does not mean freedom to compete in life without artificial restrictions (including Church or State structures designed to do the job for you, thus releasing you from the burden). What it means is freedom from marginalization, a much more complicated affair having to do with what the Bible calls mercy – but that too then becomes a word needing careful defining. Indeed, salvation in the Bible does not come about by way of the discovery of a difficult or hidden truth about how life should be lived – a process which, if validated, would give the intelligent and well read an advantage. On the contrary it comes about by way of a shaming of the Gentiles – a process over which humans have no direct control though here the marginals, as a result of their circumstances, are better placed to be of use. ( Marginals are the only ones capable of being the instrument of salvation since they at least can clearly see what is needed. The whole process is beyond the Gentiles as blinkered civilisation folk.)

But what about Illich’s business of gratuity, gift and grace? This is where things become both complicated and interesting. Illich’s argument is that this gratuity stuff is difficult for us moderns, with our scientific thinking, to comprehend since it neither comes from chance nor cause, which we can easily take on board, but rather from something unexpected which occurs in between and which results from a call – as in God’s summons to Abraham or Jesus’ summoning of his disciples:

… in the Bible this [gratuity] is the primary form of ‘causation’ … The Gospels extract from its readers the recognition that what it presents is neither necessity nor chance but a superabundant gift freely given to those who freely accept it.

I am, of course, basically in agreement with Illich that in life we experience two realms. First, the domain of chance and cause-and-effect (which is generally labelled the natural world) and second the domain involving choice and responsibility which Illich labels gratuity but which I for my part call the world of ideology. Up to this point the only difference between us (apart from the labels we impose on these two domains) would seem to be the fact that Illich claims this second domain is difficult for the modern mind to grasp. For while I agree that in dealing with the Bible scientists like Dawkins ignore the ideological question it would never occur to me that this is due to the fact that they find ideological questions intrinsically difficult to deal with. Why then does Illich claim that the modern mind has difficulty in dealing with this gratuity business? The answer is immediately apparent from the way he continues:

This gift becomes fully visible only at the moment of its rejection, the moment which I take to be the point of the Gospel, the crucifixion.

The matter now becomes clear: whereas I see this business of human choice involving responsibility as political, a phenomenon in no way strange to the modern mind, Illich sees the business of human choice, which he claims results from a call, as essentially religious and religion, as we all know, is indeed problematic for many people today, myself included!

So what is Illich’s justification for claiming that this second realm involves religion rather than ideology? For the moment all we have to go on are his two ideas: gratuity and call and these clearly indicate that what he is on about is election. Here complications become severe so let me put things as clearly as I can by saying that what we are faced with is two alternatives. In the Bible Yahweh has to be seen either as the god of the marginals or as the god who just happens for reasons best known to himself to choose Israel. Apparently Illich along with most liberal exegetes (e.g. Brueggemann See God of the Marginals p. 334) plumps for the second alternative whereas I firmly embrace the first.

Before considering which formulation squares best with the texts I want to come to a better understanding of them. My own formula ‘Yahweh is the god of the marginals’ is clearly an ideological statement since it indicates that the deity is to be seen as representing the power and interests of a particular group of human beings. Using this formulation it is presumed from the word go that the essential character of the god is known. As, in the Mesopotamian myths, the god Enlil represents the power and interests of the military overlords and the god Enki their priestly administrative partners so Yahweh in (most of) the Genesis and Exodus texts represents the power and interests of the despised and marginalized Hebrew community situated first as slaves in Egypt and then as refugees in the Palestinian highlands. The interesting thing to note is that the second formulation ‘breaks’ this identity between a group of people and their god so that, at least in the beginning, nothing is known of the character of this mysterious god who happens one day to choose a particular people. This ‘break’, of course, destroys the formulation as an ideological construct and gives it that element of surprise and novelty which Illich characterises as grace, gift or gratuity. From this initial point of unknowing knowledge can only be acquired by revelation, which is to say by something parachuted into the universe from outside. In other words the ‘breaking’ we are talking about here consists in ‘changing’ an ideological formula into a religious one using the ‘grace = exterior intervention’ idea.  

Now let me be clear. This time my argument is not that the idea of gratuity – of a god who appears on the scene as one unknown and who chooses Israel for no obvious reason – is a bourgeois construct which liberals inexcusably inflict on the text. For such an idea is clearly present in some biblical texts, notably Ezekiel’s story of the female baby rescued from exposure and death by an unknown stranger. My argument is that such writings can only properly be understood when seen as revisionist offerings. Here, you see, I am indeed now arguing that they are secondary and that they were designed so as to control and correct earlier ‘revolutionary’ writings. In my work God of the Marginals I argue at length that the basic tactic of biblical revisionists like P was to get rid of the god of the marginals and to replace him by lauding to the skies his religious alter ego: the metacosmic god ( See God of the Marginals pp. 134-135; 199-200; 295-296; 322 and 459 ) All we have here is yet another example of the same perfidious exercise, which makes me think that perhaps Ezekiel was the one who actually invented the procedure since he could hardly have learned it from P who, by all accounts, was post-exilic. But how do I justify a reading of the Bible which makes election a revisionist doctrine? Very simply, the doctrine appears for the first time in the Deuteronomists’ work and only then in a fragmentary form. This means that it is completely absent in J and the classical prophets. J himself emphasises that Yahweh and the god of the fathers are one and the same (Ex 3.13-15) and he describes Yahweh as referring to himself as the god of the marginal Hebrews (Ex 3.18). Indeed for my money it is impossible to account for the religious metacosmic god either in his alter ego guise in J or in his gratuity guise in Ezekiel without supposing that he developed from the god of the marginals, for otherwise you would have to see him as appearing out of the blue, unlike anything seen before or since: a full blown private revelation from the skies. And that, for my money is unacceptable scientifically and theologically.

 

 

Previous - - Next